Domestic values and the judicial process by Toulson, Roger
To consider the relationship between the judicialprocess and democratic values is to enter broad anddeep waters. A combination of representative
government and an independent judiciary requires
constitutional adjustment of some kind or another.
Economically, demographically and culturally our society is
in a state of continuous change and development, and that
process is likely to result in a rather slower process of
change in the relationship between different organs of the
state. It is likely to be slower because the institutions of a
stable democracy are intended to provide a framework
within which economic, social and cultural change can be
accommodated without threat to the fabric of society. But
it is part of the history of democracies that constitutional
arrangements, whether written or conventional, do not
remain static.
There are bound at times to be tensions. Presently there
are two particular areas where serious concerns have been
expressed either about the democratic appropriateness of
the judicial process or about a gap of understanding
between judiciary and the public. These concerns relate to
judicial review and the Human Rights Act, and to criminal
law and sentencing. On these subjects, the opinions held
are likely to depend very much on the perspective from
which they are viewed. I would like to try to take a broad
approach, that of a landscapist rather that a miniaturist.
The Human Rights Act is in its early days. Its main
provisions came into effect in October 2000. Professor
Tom Campbell in his stimulating contribution (entitled
Incorporation Through Interpretation) to a series of essays
published under the title Sceptical Essays on Human Rights
(OUP 2001) wrote that:
“What actually transpires will depend crucially on the use
that the judiciary makes of the central provisions of the HRA,
but the constitutional scene is now set for the legally
legitimate but still democratically problematic exercise of
greatly enhanced political power by judges in the British
political system. Whereas it used to be commonplace to say
that the absolute legal sovereignty of Parliament is in effect
limited only by political considerations, the new interpretative
powers granted to the courts by the HRA are powers that are
now subject only to political factors, such as hostile public
reaction to court decisions.”
He further predicted that:
“It is realistic to assume that the prime long term impact of
the ECHR will derive less from its content than from its
displacement of the centrality of plain, literal or ordinary
meaning [in the construction of statutes] in favour of a
textually unrestrained process of enforcing particular judicial
views of the proper goals of a democratic society.”
Similar concerns have been voiced by others.
As everyone knows, many of the articles of the ECHR
are expressed in very broad terms, and many are subject to
exceptions where “necessary in a democratic society” for
the protection of other values also expressed often in broad
language. What is necessary in a democratic society
therefore becomes a matter of legal judgement. Since the
European Court of Human Rights has stressed that the
Convention is a living instrument, it is open to the judges
to develop and refine what is necessary in a democratic
society according to the views of the judiciary and to
interpret legislation in accordance with that view, even if
that is not its natural meaning, unless the language is so
precise as to make such interpretation impossible (in which
case the court can make a declaration of incompatibility).
The ability of judges to give to a statute a non-natural
meaning in order to comply with the judge’s view of what
is necessary in a democratic society, and to apply it
accordingly, is in some ways a more pervasive power than
the power to make a declaration of incompatibility while
applying the statute according to its terms. How then is a
judge to determine what is necessary in a democratic
society?
There has always been a potential conflict between
democracy and the rights of individuals, and this is a
problem for all liberal forms of government. In modern
liberal societies there have been two principal avenues of
thought about what gives legitimacy to a system of
government – the will of the people and the rights of the
people. 3
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According to the first avenue, the adult members of a
society have equal rights to determine what is best for their
society. This provides the basis for government by
representatives chosen by free elections at regular intervals.
What these representatives decide has legitimacy because
they represent the voice of the people.
In his Considerations on Representative Government in 1861
John Stuart Mill wrote:
“There is no difficulty in showing that the ideally best form of
government is that in which the sovereignty, or supreme
controlling power in the last resort, is vested in the entire
aggregate of the community; every citizen not only having a
voice in the exercise of that ultimate sovereignty, but being, at
least occasionally, called on to take an actual part in the
government, by the personal discharge of some public
function, local or general.”
The proposition that this was the ideal form of
government rested, he said:
“Upon two principles, of as universal truth and applicability
as any general propositions which can be laid down respecting
human affairs. The first is, that the rights and interests of
every or any person are only secure from being disregarded
when the person interested is himself able, and habitually
disposed, to stand up for them. The second is, that the
general prosperity attains a greater height, and is more widely
diffused, in proportion to the amount and variety of the
personal energies enlisted in promoting it.”
Mill emphasised that he was speaking of what was ideal.
He recognised that a majority might act in ways which
were unfair to minorities. He said:
“One of the greatest dangers of democracy as of all other
forms of government lies in the sinister interest of the holders
of power … And one of the most important questions
demanding consideration, in determining the best constitution
of a representative government, is how to provide efficacious
securities against this evil.”
He expressed the aim that “the representative system
ought not to allow any of the various sectional interests to
be so powerful as to be capable of prevailing against truth
and justice”. He was therefore not an out-and-out
majoritarian.
But how should “truth and justice”, against which
majoritarian government should not be allowed to prevail,
be ascertained and protected? Mill did not suggest a clear
or precise answer, although he did propose that there
should be parliamentary checks and balances through
extended suffrage, proportional representation and a
reformed second chamber, and he was adamant that
politics and majoritarian opinion should play no part in the
appointment or removal of judges. As to the last point he
said:
“Of all officers of government, those in whose appointment
any participation of popular suffrage is the most objectionable
are judicial officers. … There are none in whose case absolute
impartiality, and freedom from connection with politicians or
sections of politicians, are of anything like equal importance.
Some thinkers, among others Mr Bentham, have been of
opinion that, although it is better that judges should not be
appointed by popular election, the people of their district
ought to have the power, after sufficient experience, of
removing them from their trust. It cannot be denied that the
irremovability of any public officer, to whom great interests are
entrusted, is in itself an evil. It is far from desirable that there
should be no means of getting rid of a bad or incompetent
judge, unless for such misconduct as he can be made to
answer for in a criminal court; and that a functionary on
whom so much depends should have the feeling of being free
from responsibility except to opinion and his own conscience.
The question however is, whether in the peculiar position of a
judge, and supposing that all practicable securities have been
taken for an honest appointment, irresponsibility, except to his
own and the public conscience, has not on the whole less
tendency to pervert his conduct than responsibility to the
government or to popular vote. Experience has long decided
this point in the affirmative as regards responsibility to the
executive; and the case is quite equally strong when the
responsibility sought to be enforced is to the suffrages of
electors. Among the good qualities of a popular constituency,
those peculiarly incumbent upon a judge, calmness and
impartiality, are not numbered.”
According to the second principal avenue of thought,
human beings have individual rights. Orderly society
necessitates the placing of limits on what its members are
free to do, but the proper object of the system of
government is to provide the best available protection of
those rights on an equal basis for all its members.
Metaphorically, the majoritarian principle and the rights
principle may be seen as two poles, around which liberal
systems of government have developed. The tensions
between the two polar forces have been accommodated
through checks and balances. A further reason for having
checks and balances is that all human institutions have their
fallibilities. In the words of Professor Isaiah Berlin, adapted
from Kant, “Out of the crooked timber of humanity
nothing entirely straight was ever made” – a saying which
applies to the judicial process as much as to any other.
The Human Rights Act came at the end of a century
which saw not only a vast increase in the powers of central
government through primary and secondary legislation,
much of it the subject of little parliamentary scrutiny, but
also major changes in the checks and balances affecting the
exercise of those powers.
A hundred years ago considerably less than half the adult
population in the United Kingdom had the vote. The
monarchy still had some real political power and the
House of Lords had major political powers.
Today the monarch acts in constitutional matters on the
advice of her ministers (save theoretically in circumstances4
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so exceptional that they have not occurred during the
present reign) and the House of Lords has dwindled to a
high class debating chamber selected in an odd fashion.
There is generally little check between the legislature and
the executive because the government of the day (as long
as it has a comfortable working majority) controls both.
But other checks have been developed. At the head of
the list have been the introduction of universal adult
suffrage and the expansion of the reach and role of the
media. To digress briefly, the constitutional role of the
media and the constitutional protections required for it are
themselves interesting and important topics. The media
have a number of functions: to inform the public; to raise
questions about matters of public importance; to act as
lobbyists; to entertain; and (except for public service
broadcasters) to make profits for shareholders. In
considering the constitutional protection which the media
ought to have, I am not sure that we always consider with
sufficient clarity this divergence of functions. The role of
the media as part of the entertainment industry is very
different from its role as a constitutional watchdog.
But I am presently concerned with judicial review and
the Human Rights Act, which are undoubtedly important
constitutional developments. I return to Professor
Campbell’s concerns. What is there to restrain the courts
from exercising their powers in a way which is
democratically illegitimate?
It has been recognised by the House of Lords that the
courts should accord such deference, or respect, to the
decisions of the legislature and the executive as may be
appropriate, applying principles which are in the process of
being fashioned. This important subject has been discussed
in three recent high profile cases: International Transport
Roth GmbH v Home Secretary [2003] QB 728, A v Home
Secretary [2003] 2 WLR 564 and R (Pro Life) v BBC [2003]
2 WLR 1403. In each of those cases the discussion was
sharpened by a division of opinion among the judges.
The use of the term “deference” has become common,
but it has a tendency to mislead for reasons stated by Lord
Hoffman and echoed by Lord Walker in R (Pro Life) v BBC.
Deference carries a flavour of a subordinate kow-towing to
a superior, whereas the role of the court is intended to be
complementary to those of the legislature and the
executive.
The court has to decide on principles of law how far it
should properly go in the review of legislative or executive
decisions without usurping the proper functions of the
legislature and the executive. Lord Walker said in R (Pro
Life) v BBC that at this stage in the bedding down of the
1998 Act it would be a mistake for the courts to go too far
in attempting any comprehensive statement of principle,
but that it is clear that any simple “one size fits all”
formulation would be impossible. In the USA, which has a
Bill of Rights dating back to 1791 (although it is right to
say that a serious system of judicial review based on non-
property human rights did not begin until the early part of
the twentieth century) there is still no single,
comprehensive principle for determining the scope of
judicial review, and I doubt very much whether we shall
have one a hundred years from now. But while there may
be no single formula waiting to be discovered, there are
certainly lessons to be learned from the experiences of
other jurisdictions, and our courts are in the process of
recognising certain criteria or guidelines, the force of
which may vary according to the particular facts of the
case.
Laws LJ identified the following four general principles
in his judgment in International Transport Roth GmbH v Home
Secretary: first, that greater deference is to be paid to an Act
of Parliament than to a decision of the executive or
subordinate measures; second, that there is more scope for
deference where the Convention itself requires a balance to
be struck; third, that greater deference will be due to
democratic powers where the subject matter is peculiarly
within their constitutional responsibility (e.g. defence of
the realm) and less when it lies more particularly within the
constitutional responsibility of the courts; and fourth, that
greater or lesser deference will be due according to
whether the subject matter lies more readily within the
actual or potential expertise of the democratic powers or
the courts.
Lord Goldsmith QC in a recent article in The
Commonwealth Lawyer, Vol. 12, no. 1, page 38, entitled
“Governing within the rule of law: the courts and the executive”,
took issue with the suggestion that as a matter of general
approach greater deference should be paid to an Act of
Parliament than to a decision of the executive or a
subordinate measure, because it was over formalistic and
failed to take adequate account of the way in which
responsibility for decisions is allocated within our
constitutional arrangements. He quoted Lord Steyn’s
saying in R (Daly) v Home Secretary [2001] 2 AC 532 that “in
law context is everything” and suggested four themes
which should inform the court’s consideration in any
particular case. The first was whether the particular subject
matter lies more within the field of expertise of the
government (such as matters of macro economic policy or
national security) or of the courts. The second was whether
the subject matter by its nature requires “democratic
legitimacy” and so should be left to those democratically
accountable, for example because it involves contentious
moral issues on which society is divided or is “highly
political”. The third was the nature of the Convention right
engaged and, in particular, whether it is qualified or
unqualified. The fourth was what he termed “the
polycentricity factor”, i.e. whether the quashing of a
decision would have undesirable and unintended knock on
effects in other areas.
It is clear that there is a healthy debate under way. The
ideas to which I have referred are all thought provoking
and there is a good degree of overlap between them. At the 5





risk of over simplicity, it seems to me that in general three
sets of factors are likely to be important in considering the
limits the courts should set themselves: the nature of the
right and context in which it is engaged; the obviousness or
doubtfulness of the apparent or suggested infringement;
and the degree of relevant knowledge or expertise of the
legislature or executive compared with that of the court.
Those factors may point in the same or different
directions, and analysing them may call for careful
judgment.
As to the nature of the right and its engagement, a large
amount of legislation and executive decision making relates
to matters of economic and social policy, where
majoritarian power is bound to be the principal
determinant of change under any form of elected
government.
A hundred years ago Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, in
his first opinion in the Supreme Court, set out what still
stands today as a lucid and cogent statement of the courts’
proper approach to judicial review in such an area and the
reasons for it. The case, Otis v Parker 187 US 606 (1903),
concerned the constitutionality of a provision of the
California constitution which made void any contract for
the sale of company shares on margin or for delivery on a
future day and provided that any money paid under such
contract should be recoverable by the payer. Its
constitutionality was challenged under the Fourteenth
Amendment, which provides that no state shall deprive any
person of liberty or property without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. It is loosely comparable in subject
matter with Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR,
which is concerned with the protection of property, and
Article 14, which is concerned with discrimination in the
enjoyment of Convention rights. The objection to the
provision was that it unlawfully interfered with the
property rights of the owners of company stock, because it
bore no reasonable relation to the evil sought to be cured;
and that it unjustifiably discriminated against owners of
that class of property compared with other forms of
property in respect of which similar types of speculative
contract were permitted.
Holmes wrote as follows:
“It is true, no doubt, that neither a state legislature nor a
state constitution can interfere arbitrarily with private business
or transactions, and that the mere fact that an enactment
purports to be for the protection of public safety, health or
morals, is not conclusive upon the courts. But general
propositions do not carry us far. While the courts must exercise
a judgment of their own, it by no means is true that every law
is void which may seem to the judges who pass upon it
excessive, unsuited to its ostensible end, or based upon
conceptions of morality with which they disagree. Considerable
latitude must be allowed for differences of view as well as for
possible peculiar conditions which this court can know but
imperfectly, if at all. Otherwise a constitution, instead of
embodying only relatively fundamental rules of right, as
generally understood by all English-speaking communities,
would become the partisan of a particular set of ethical or
economical opinions, which by no means are held semper
ubique et ab omnibus.
Even if the provision before us should seem to us not to have
been justified by the circumstances locally existing in
California at the time when it was passed, it is shown by its
adoption to have expressed a deep-seated conviction on the
part of the people concerned as to what that policy required.
Such a deep-seated conviction is entitled to great respect. If
the state thinks that an admitted evil cannot be prevented
expect by prohibiting a calling or transaction not in itself
necessarily objectionable, the courts cannot interfere, unless,
in looking at the substance of the matter, they can see that it
“is a clear, unmistakable infringement of rights secured by the
fundamental law.” No court would declare a usury law
unconstitutional, even if every member of it believed that
Jeremy Bentham had said that the last word on that subject,
and had shown for all time that such laws did more harm
than good.”
Holmes did not suggest that a state’s power to frame its
social and economic policy must in all circumstances
override all other considerations. If, for example, a statute
were to expropriate property without compensation, that
would be in his words “a clear, unmistakable infringement
of rights secured by the fundamental law”; but regulation
of contracts and expropriation of property are different
kettles of fish.
Although Holmes wrote for the majority in Otis v Parker,
he battled with his brethren on the court in the years that
followed. In Lochner v New York 198 USA 45 (1905) a
majority of the Supreme Court struck down a New York
statute which limited the number of hours of work in
bakeries to ten hours a day and 60 hours a week on the
ground that it infringed the employees’ constitutional
liberty to contract to work for longer hours. In a famous
dissenting judgment, which in later years came to be
accepted as a sound embodiment of principle, Holmes
wrote:
“This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large
part of the country does not entertain. If it were a question
whether I agreed with that theory, I should desire to study it
further and long before making up my mind. But I do not
conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that my
agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right
of a majority to embody their opinions in law. It is settled by
various decisions of this court that state constitutions and
state laws may regulate life in many ways which we as
legislators might think as injudicious or if you like as
tyrannical as this, and which equally with this interfere with
the liberty to contract. Sunday laws and usury laws are aged
examples. A more modern one is the prohibition of lotteries.
The liberty of the citizen to do as he likes so long as he does6
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not interfere with the liberty of others to do the same, which
has long been a shibboleth for some well-known writers, is
interfered with by school laws, by the Post Office, by every
state or municipal institution which takes his money for
purposes thought desirable, whether he likes it or not. The
Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr Herbert Spencer’s
Social Statics … Two years ago we upheld the prohibition of
sales of stock on margins or for future delivery in the
constitution of California. The decision sustaining an eight
hour law for miners is still recent. Some of these laws embody
convictions or prejudices which judges are likely to share.
Some may not. But a constitution is not intended to embody
a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the
organic relation of the citizen to the state or of laissez faire. It
is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the
accident of finding certain opinions natural and familiar or
novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment
on the question whether the statutes embodying them conflict
with the constitution of the United States.
… I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth
Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural
outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a
rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute
proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have
been understood by the traditions of our people and our law.
It does not need research to show that no such sweeping
condemnation can be passed upon the statute before us. A
reasonable man might think it a proper measure on the score
of health.”
The battle within the Supreme Court in this area
reached its climax when a majority ruled unconstitutional
various statutes containing key parts of President
Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation. The President threatened
to try to increase the size of the court and there was a
constitutional crisis. It was resolved when one of the
previous majority of five changed sides, provoking the quip
that “a switch in time saves nine”. (Justice Roberts changed
his approach, beginning with Morehead v New York ex rel
Tipaldo 298 US 587 (1936), where the court upheld a
minimum wage law.)
While there are strong reasons why the courts should
ordinarily keep out of the arena of economic and social
policy in the exercise of their powers of judicial review, it
has long been recognised that the courts are proper
protectors of core personal freedoms, such as freedom
from detention, freedom of movement and association,
enjoyment of private and family life, freedom of speech and
the right to a fair criminal trial process. There is in general
no institutional reason why the courts should refrain from
scrutinising strictly the legality of interference with those
rights, and they have a responsibility to do so.
It follows that whether a court views a case as falling
within the territory in which it should not normally
intervene or as falling within a natural justiciable area may
be of decisive importance.
International Transport Roth GmbH v Home Secretary
provides a recent example. The case concerned the
lawfulness of a penalty scheme imposed on lorry drivers
and haulage companies under section 32 of the
Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 making them liable to
pay £2000 for every person caught trying to enter the
country hidden in a vehicle. Sullivan J, in a judgment
described by Simon Brown LJ as a tour de force, found that
the scheme was unlawful. His decision was upheld by a
majority of the Court of Appeal (Simon Brown and
Jonathan Parker LJJ, Laws LJ dissenting). The majority
classified the scheme as part of the criminal law. It has been
held that, while various matters may have to be balanced in
determining what amounts to a fair trial under Article 6, an
accused person’s right under that article to a fair trial is
unqualified. The majority concluded that the scheme
contravened Article 6 because it not only placed a reverse
burden of proof on the carrier to show that he was
blameless but also empowered the immigration authority
to impound the carrier’s vehicle until he had either put up
security for a substantial fixed penalty or proved his
innocence. They also considered that the scheme fell foul
of Article 1 of the First Protocol (providing protection of
property) but the judgments of the majority concentrated
mainly on Article 6. The dissenting member of the court,
Laws LJ, saw the scheme as a part of the civil law. Although
it was draconian in relation to the carriers, he did not
consider that a court could impugn the minister’s
evaluation that the scheme was necessary to combat the
serious social evil at which it was aimed.
I have referred to core freedoms, but I would not
advocate a rigid or formal hierarchy of rights, such as first
generation rights and second generation rights (terms used
by some), as a universal determinant of the appropriate
degree of judicial self-restraint or strictness of scrutiny,
because the form and context in which the issue arises may
have an important bearing on the proper approach of the
court. Nor does the fact that the issue involves
consideration of a core freedom mean that the court must
therefore assume the role of primary finder and evaluator
of the facts. The court’s concern is with legal principles
and whether the legislation or decision under
consideration is impeachable. That does not exclude a
judgment area for the legislature or decision-maker the
bounds of which must be respected by the court.
Determining whether the matter under review is properly
within those bounds may involve hard questions.
By way of illustration of these points, consider freedom
of speech. Everyone recognises that it is a core freedom. It
is protected by Article 10 of the Convention. In the USA it
is protected by the First Amendment. In no country is it
unqualified. In the USA the approach of the courts has
been based on the philosophy that an unregulated market
place of ideas is essential for the good of society as a whole.
In another of his dissenting opinions which later gained
acceptance, Justice Holmes said: 7





“… when men have realised that time has upset many
fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they
believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas –
that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that
truth is the only ground upon which their wishes can safely be
carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.
Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation
upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While
that experiment is part of our system I think that we should
be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression
of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with
death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate
interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law
that an immediate check is required to save the country.”
(Abrams v United States 250 US 616 (1919)).
This philosophy has not only come to be accepted, but
it has been applied in ways which might seem surprising to
some. An expert in US constitutional law, Professor Mark
Tushnet, has observed that “the Supreme Court has
developed free expression doctrine in a way that makes it
almost impossible to enforce legislation restricting so
called hate speech”. (“Scepticism about judicial review: a
perspective from the United States”: published in Sceptical
Essays on Human Rights, Oxford University Press 2001.)
This comment was based on a majority decision of the
Supreme Court in RAV v City of St Paul 505 US 377 (1992),
where the court struck down a hate speech ordinance on
the ground that it was not “content neutral”, because it
prohibited fighting words of racists or sexists, but not those
of individuals fighting racism or sexism. Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, said:
“St Paul has no authority to license one side to fight free
style, while requiring the other to follow Marquess of
Queensberry rules.”
The Supreme Court has also decided that statutory
restrictions on a political candidate’s expenditures violate
free expression.
An eminent critic, Professor Owen Fiss, has provided an
interesting commentary on these and other recent US
Supreme Court decisions in a book entitled “The Irony of
Free Speech” (Harvard University Press, 1996). The irony
to which he refers is that a doctrine of freedom of speech
developed in order to promote and protect democratic self
rule should be used, according to his argument, in a way
which militates against democratic self rule by allowing the
underdog to be intimidated or drowned out.
Professor Fiss observes that there is in truth a
distinction to be drawn between a libertarian and a
democratic theory of speech, and that the libertarian
theory is unable to explain why the interests of speakers
should take priority over the interests of those individuals
who are discussed in the speech, or who must listen to the
speech, when those two sets of interests conflict.
He also argues that:
“Content neutrality is not an end in itself and should not be
reified. The principle responds to some underlying concern
that the state might use its power to skew debate in order to
advance particular outcomes, and this purpose should always
be kept in mind. Accordingly, the principle should not be
extended to situations like hate speech, pornography and
political expenditures, in which private parties are skewing
debate and the state regulation promotes free and open
debate. In those cases the state may be disfavouring certain
speakers – the cross-burner, the pornographer or the big
spender – and make judgments based on content, but
arguably only to make certain that all sides are heard. The
state is simply acting as a fair-minded parliamentarian,
devoted to having all views presented.”
In this jurisdiction, R (Pro Life) v BBC raised an important
question about the court’s approach under Article 10, on
which there was a sharp divergence of judicial opinion.
During the last general election campaign Pro Life wanted
to show pictures of aborted foetuses in a televised election
broadcast. The BBC wrote on behalf of all the channels
refusing to transmit the material on the grounds that by
prevailing standards of taste and decency the images would
be offensive to very large numbers of viewers. Independent
broadcasters operate under licences granted by the
Independent Television Commission, which is under a
statutory duty (by section 6(1)(a) of the Broadcasting Act
1990) to do what it can to ensure that nothing is included
in broadcast programmes which “offends against good taste or
decency or is likely … to be offensive to public feeling”. The BBC
operates under an agreement with the government which
contains a similar requirement.
Pro Life argued that the broadcasters’ refusal to screen
the material infringed its rights under Article 10. Scott
Baker J refused the application on the ground that Pro
Life’s right of free speech was qualified by reference to the
rights of others, which included the rights of viewers not to
be confronted with offensive material in their own homes,
and that it was impossible to conclude that the decision to
refuse to screen the material was irrational.
The Court of Appeal (at [2002] 3 WLR 1080) allowed
an appeal by Pro Life, holding that the judge had adopted
a mistaken approach. Laws LJ identified what he saw as the
real issue in the case as being whether the considerations of
taste and offensiveness which moved the broadcasters
constituted a legal justification for the censorship involved
in banning the proposed broadcast. Because of the
importance of protecting political speech, particularly in
the run up to a general election, the court had to decide for
itself whether such censorship was justified. The
reasonableness of the broadcasters’ view was not the
critical issue, and the weight to be attached to their opinion
was modest. He accepted that there might be instances in8
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which political speech might justifiably be censored on
grounds of taste or offensiveness, but it would take a very
extreme case. He held that freedom of political speech at a
public election must not be interfered with save on the
most pressing grounds, and that no such grounds had been
established.
Simon Brown LJ identified the ultimate question for
decision as being “whether the ban was necessary in a democratic
society” under Article 10(2). He stressed that the
importance of freedom of expression in the context of
political speech was hard to exaggerate and, against that
background, he concluded that there was no pressing social
need to ban the broadcast.
The House of Lords, by a majority of four to one,
disagreed with the approach of the Court of Appeal and
restored the judgment of Scott Baker J. The majority held
that the Court of Appeal had erred in failing to identify and
distinguish between two different questions. The first was
whether the standards of taste and decency imposed on
broadcasters were lawfully applicable to party broadcasts as
much as to other broadcasts. If so, the second question was
whether the broadcasters had properly applied them.
There was no explicit challenge by Pro Life to the
lawfulness of the imposition of taste and decency standards
on the broadcasters, and Lord Nicholls (with whom Lord
Millett agreed) therefore did not consider it necessary to
discuss the first question. Lord Hoffman took a different
approach because he considered that, although Pro Life did
not argue that the taste and decency requirements imposed
on the broadcasters were inconsistent with its rights under
Article 10, its argument entailed submitting that those
requirements should be disregarded or not taken seriously.
He therefore considered the taste and decency
requirements and he concluded that the rationale for
having such standards applied to political as well as to any
other broadcasts; the standards were part of the country’s
cultural life and had created expectations on the part of
viewers as to what they would and would not be shown on
the screens in their homes. Lord Walker noted that the
taste and decency requirements were in imprecise terms
and called for a value judgment to be made. On the basis
that the broadcasters were under an obligation to apply the
taste and decency requirements, the majority agreed that
the broadcasters could not be said to have done other than
give effect to them.
A number of comments may be made. First,
determining the point at which disturbing images become
sufficiently offensive to wide numbers of the public that
they ought not to be shown on television is obviously a
difficult matter. It is one which broadcasters are better
qualified to assess than judges, because broadcasters carry
out surveys in order to gauge current levels of public
acceptability and they constantly receive viewers’
comments. Second, there is a point to be considered
whether political broadcasts should be allowed to contain
material which may be shocking in order to put across a
serious political message. It is not an issue likely to have
been given particular consideration when the Broadcasting
Act 1990 was passed, and, since under that Act the same
rule applies to political broadcasting as to other broadcasts,
it was not an issue which the broadcasters could evaluate.
Third, on the question whether Pro Life’s broadcast should
have been immune from the taste and decency
requirement applicable to other broadcasts, arguments can
be put on either side, both of a narrower and of a broader
kind. On the narrower front, there was the importance to
Pro Life of being able to put across its message in a
dramatic way, but there was also the likelihood of distress
which would be caused to many people viewing the
programme in their own homes, including women who
had undergone abortions for one reason or another.
On a broader level, the arguments would include general
arguments about the importance of freedom of political
speech but also the concerns expressed by the Electoral
Commission in its 2003 report on party political
broadcasting (to which Lord Hoffman referred) about the
possibility that any lobby group might become able to
transmit into people’s homes material of an offensive
nature by registering itself as a political party. Fourth, there
happens to be a Communication Bill before Parliament.
There is therefore now an opportunity for a democratic
debate about these matters. Fifth, the decision of the
House of Lords has the benefit of allowing the question
whether taste and decency standards ordinarily applicable
to broadcasts should be applied in the same way to political
broadcasts to be determined as a result of that process of
debate rather than pre-empted by judicial decision.
I have referred to the obviousness or doubtfulness of an
apparent or alleged infringement of human rights as a
factor of general relevance when a court is considering a
human rights challenge, whether to the compatibility of
legislation with the Convention or to an executive decision.
If it may reasonably be concluded that the legislation is
compatible with the Convention, or can be read in a way
which is compatible with it, or that the decision under
review was not unlawful, the court should so conclude. To
interpret legislation in a way which does not correspond
with its primary meaning, or to declare it incompatible
with the Convention, or to hold that the executive has
acted unlawfully, may be necessary and right, but it should
never be done lightly.
Similar to this principle, if not an alternative way of
putting it, is the concept of “latitude”. In R (Pro Life) v BBC
Lord Walker quoted a passage from Michael Fordham’s
Judicial Review Handbook (third edition, 2001), which
included the following:
“Hand in hand with proportionality principles is a concept of
‘latitude’ which recognises that the court does not become the
primary decision-maker on matters of policy, judgement and
discretion, so that public authorities should be left with room
to make legitimate choices. The width of the latitude (and the 9





intensity of review which it dictates) can change, depending
on the context and circumstances.”
I have referred also to the question of the expertise of
the court, compared with the expertise of the author of the
policy under review. If the court does not have the
necessary knowledge or expertise to be able properly to
determine whether there has been a breach of the
claimant’s human rights, it has no option but to reject the
claim. This can present acute difficulty where there is a
prima facie interference with the claimant’s rights but the
court is unable to look into or behind the public authority’s
evaluation of the circumstances relied on to justify it. The
classic instance is a case involving national security.
A v Home Secretary [2003] 2 WLR 564 provides a recent
example. The Court of Appeal upheld the lawfulness of
section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act
2001, providing for the detention of non-nationals if the
Home Secretary believes that their presence in the UK is a
risk to national security and suspects that they are
terrorists, but for the time being they cannot be deported
because of fears for their safety or other practical
considerations. The Home Secretary had based his
decision about what was necessary in the interests of
national security on information and advice from the
Security Service. Brooke LJ said:
“Unless one is willing to adopt a purist approach, saying that
it is better that this country should be destroyed, together with
the ideals it stands for, than that a single suspected terrorist
should be detained without due process, it seems to me
inevitable that the judiciary must be willing … to put an
appropriate degree of trust in the willingness and capacity of
ministers and Parliament, who are publicly accountable for
their decisions, to satisfy themselves about the integrity and
professionalism of the Security Service.”
The language of the first half of that sentence is
reminiscent of the title of a book by Chief Justice
Rehnquist of the United States, “All The Laws But One”
(1998), about civil liberties in war time. The title came
from a message from President Lincoln to a special session
of Congress on 4 July 1861, justifying his decision to
suspend habeas corpus in order to enable the military to
deal summarily with rioting mobs in Baltimore, who
threatened to prevent the reinforcement of the capital by
troops from the north passing through Baltimore by rail
road. In his message the President asked rhetorically:
“Are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the
government itself to go to pieces, less that one be violated?”
Having traced the history of civil liberties from the
American Civil War through two World Wars, including the
internment in the Second World War of more than one
hundred thousand people of Japanese origin, and the resulting
court cases, the author notes in his final chapter that the
courts have tended to give decisions in favour of civil liberty
more often when the case has been ultimately decided after
the end of hostilities than during them. Although we like to
say that during wars the laws are not silent, the sober reality
appears to be that in times of national emergency judges
are as much affected by majoritarian sentiment as the
society of which they are a part. In this country it is
difficult to explain otherwise the judgments of four of the
five Law Lords in Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206.
Another person interned in the same month as Robert
Liversidge was a distinguished former judge and chairman
of the Law Commission, Sir Michael Kerr. He gave an
account of his experiences in his autobiography “As Far As I
Remember”. He was detained in May 1940 as he was coming
to the end of his first year as an undergraduate reading law
at Cambridge University. Also detained was one of his
supervisors, Kurt Lipstein, who is happily still supervising
undergraduates at the age of 94 and recently told me
something about his memories of internment. From both
accounts there is a picture of bureaucratic muddle and
incompetence. Michael Kerr was eventually released after
six months, as a result of some enterprising lobbying by his
mother and an intervention by his former headmaster. He
then joined the RAF and became a pilot.
For a person to be deprived of his liberty at a time of
national emergency because of security intelligence which
cannot be verified in a court of law on ordinary rules of
evidence may be a price which has to be paid in the
interests of the safety of the realm, but there is no reason
why a person should be detained through bureaucratic
bungling or laziness. It would therefore be going much too
far to say that the courts cannot scrutinise interference
with human liberty where the grounds advanced are the
need to protect the safety of the state at a time of emergency.
The area which a court is qualified to inquire into may be
restricted, but in matters of human freedom half a loaf is
still better than no bread. In this regard there is a significant
difference between the position of those detained in 1940
and asylum seekers who are currently being detained on
suspicion of being terrorists. In 1940 detainees had no
form of judicial redress. The cases of detained asylum
seekers are subject to a form of judicial investigation.
The courts also have an important role to play in policing
not only the circumstances in which national security may
justify interference with a person’s human rights, but also
the extent of the interference which may be justifiable.
Terrorism, like war, can present difficult challenges to
our legal system. Professor Alan Dershowitz of Harvard
Law School, in a book entitled Why Terrorism Works (2002,
Yale University Press), gives a hypothetical example of a
captured terrorist suspect who knows that a time bomb has
been set which is intended to kill a large number of
innocent civilians. The question which he asks is whether
it would be legitimate in the last resort to use torture to
extract information from the suspected terrorist in order
to prevent massive loss of life. He has no doubt about the
views of the public. He says:10
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“It is clear that if the preventable act of terrorism was of the
magnitude of the attacks of September 11, there would be a
great outcry in any democracy that had deliberately refused to
take available preventive action, even if it required the use of
torture. During numerous public appearances since September
11 2001, I have asked audiences for a show of hands as to
how many would support the use of non-lethal torture in a
ticking bomb case. Virtually every hand is raised. The few that
remain down go up when I ask how many believe that torture
would actually be used in such a case.”
In his stimulating and provocative discussion of the
issue, Professor Dershowitz notes that the debate over the
use of torture goes back many years, with Bentham
supporting it in a limited category of cases on utilitarian
grounds and Kant opposing it as part of his categorical
imperative against improperly using people as a means for
achieving noble ends. The Supreme Court of Israel has
outlawed the use of any physical pressure on suspects.
Article 3 of the ECHR is unqualified:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.”
There can be no doubt that it would be the duty of an
English court to investigate any allegation of a breach of
this Article, and that national security could afford no
ground for the court restricting its investigation. I am glad
that this is so, because to take the Benthamite approach
would be to start on a downward slope too slippery for
there to be any safe or acceptable limit. It is interesting to
note from Professor Dershwitz’s book that Bentham’s
approach on this subject has itself been criticised by two
Bentham scholars, W L Twining and P E Twining, on
utilitarian grounds. They argue:
“The circumstances are so extreme in which most of us would
be prepared to justify resort to torture, if at all, the conditions
we would impose would be so stringent, the practical problems
of devising and enforcing adequate safeguards so difficult and
the risks of abuse so great that it would be unwise and
dangerous to entrust any government, however enlightened,
with such a power. Even an out-and-out utilitarian can
support an absolute prohibition against institutionalised
torture on the ground that no government in the world can be
trusted not to abuse the power and to satisfy in practice the
conditions he would impose.” (Twining and Twining,
Bentham on Torture, pp 348–49).
Professor Dershowitz considers whether satisfactory
limits could be imposed by the court issuing a torture
warrant, but I do not see on what basis a court could
determine what would be a morally or legally acceptable
limit of ill-treatment. Professor Dershowitz also recognises
that the legitimisation of torture by a leading democracy
would provide a welcome justification for its use in other
parts of the world.
Having talked about general factors and discussed some
of the more particular issues which may arise in relation to
them, where does the discussion lead with regard to the
concerns expressed by Professor Campbell and others
about the democratic legitimacy of the role of the courts
under the Human Rights Act?
Under the Act, as in any area of the law, the judge needs
to be conscious at all times that while he may be involved
in fashioning the law he is also bound by the law; and that,
in so far as he is involved in developing the law, the task is
to do so in accordance with precedent, reason and
principle. In his celebrated series of lectures published as
The Nature of the Judicial Process (Yale University Press, 1921)
Benjamin Cardozo said:
“The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is
not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant
roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of
goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated
principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague
and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion
informed by tradition, methodised by analogy, disciplined by
the system, and subordinated to ‘the primordial necessity of
order in the social life’. Wide enough in all conscience is the
field of discretion that remains.”
In the constitutional field the judge must have a proper
sense of the roles of the legislature and the executive
necessary for the ordering of social life, but must also have
a deeper sense of lasting national values, as distinct from
passing fashions or his own particular predilections. As to
the latter, there will be no respect for as judge’s decision in
a controversial case if it appears to rest simply on a
personal preference.
I believe that possibly the most important, but least
appreciated, impact of the Human Rights Act is at the
Parliamentary stage, because the requirement under section
19 that a minister in charge of a Bill must either certify that
in his view its provisions are compatible with the Convention
or state that he is unable to do so requires the Bill to have
gone through rigorous scrutiny before it is passed.
In the courts, many points under the Human Rights Act
have been raised but comparatively few have attracted
public attention. Professor Campbell’s observation that the
powers are subject only to political factors, such as hostile
public reaction to court decisions, omits the constraining
factor of the courts’ own search for principle, which has
been a notable feature of the leading cases under the Act.
As to the future of judicial review and its role in a
representative democracy with a common law tradition, I
would quote the following words written by Archibald
Cox, sometime Professor of Law at Harvard University, US
Solicitor General and Watergate Special Prosecutor until
sacked by President Nixon, in a book entitled The Court and
the Constitution (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1987):
“The future of judicial review probably depends in good
measure on whether the view that law is only policy made by
courts carries the day in the legal profession, or whether room 11





is left for the older belief that judges are truly bound by law
both as a confining force and as an ideal search for reasoned
justice detached so far as humanly possible from the interest
and predilections of the individual judge. The heavily policy-
orientated view not only carries the dangers of the ‘despotism
of an oligarchy’ of which Thomas Jefferson spoke, but it cuts
off the taproots of judicial independence and legitimacy. The
older view, I believe, also conforms more closely to the people’s
expectations. Surely, if the people could be asked whether
judges should decide without restraint, a heavy majority would
reply, ‘no, they should follow the law’. But if asked whether
precedent should always be binding, surely the majority would
reply, ‘no, precedent should not always be binding. Sometimes
past law was unjust’.
In its creative aspects, wise constitutional adjudication seems
to me to draw additional legitimacy from, and is limited by, a
delicate symbiotic relationship. The great opinions of the past
shaped the Nation’s understanding of itself. They told the
people what they were by reminding them of what they might
be. But while the opinions of the Court can sometimes be the
voice of the spirit reminding us of our better selves, the roots
of such decisions must be already in the people. The
aspirations voiced by the Court must be those that the
community is willing not only to avow but in the end to live
by. The legitimacy of the great creative decisions of the past
flowed in large measure from the accuracy of the Court’s
perception of this kind of common will and from the Court’s
ability, by expressing the perception, to strike a responsive
chord equivalent to the consent of the governed. To go
further – to impose the Court’s own wiser choice – is
illegitimate.”
It is that sense of the judicial role, with its emphasis on
the search for reasoned justice, respect for precedent and
sensitivity to society’s traditions and values, which I believe
can and should inform and constrain the way in which
judicial review is developed. No doubt judicial mistakes
will be made. All democracy is an experiment. But
establishing a legal framework for the protection of
fundamental human rights within the wider framework of
our form of self-government through representatives is
surely a worthwhile part of the experiment.
An area in which public opinion polls have for decades
shown a large majority of the British public believing the
judges to be out of touch with society and doing a bad job
is criminal law and especially sentencing. This poor general
opinion has been remarkably consistent and has existed
independently of crime trends and even dramatic changes
in criminal justice policies (Hough and Roberts (1999),
“Sentencing Trends in Britain: Public Knowledge and
Public Opinion” (Punishment and Society, Vol. 1). In 1996
the British Crime Survey, as well as asking usual questions
about attitudes to sentencing, also asked much more
searching questions in order to assess the accuracy of
public knowledge and beliefs about crime and sentencing
and to test people’s preferred sentences on the facts of a
particular case. (Hough and Roberts, “Attitudes to
Punishment: Findings from the British Crime Survey”
(Home Office Research Study No. 179).) The survey
covered a nationally representative sample of 16,348
households in England and Wales, and the response rate
was 82.5%. The results were illuminating.
In answer to general questions, 82% thought that judges
were out of touch with the public; 79% thought that
sentences were too lenient; and only 20% thought that
judges were doing a good job. Unsurprisingly, there was a
strong correlation between those who thought that judges
were out of touch, those who thought that they were over
lenient, and those who thought that they were doing a poor
job. Ninety percent of those who thought that judges were
out of touch also felt that sentences were too lenient and
92% of those who thought that judges were doing a poor
job felt that sentences were too lenient.
Questions about the trends in recorded crime, the
proportion of recorded crime involving violence and the
courts’ use of imprisonment for different types of crime
(rape, mugging and burglary) revealed very considerable
misperceptions. Asked whether they would say that there
was more reported crime, less crime or about the same
amount compared with two years earlier, 4% gave the
correct answer, which was that recorded crime had gone
down. Nearly half thought that it had gone up a lot. Asked
whether they thought that the percentage of recorded
crime which involved violence or the threat of violence was
under 10%, between 10–29%, or upwards of 30%, only
3% gave the correct answer, which was that it was under
10%. Seventy-eight percent thought that it was over 30%.
There were very substantial under estimates of the
courts’ use of imprisonment for rape, mugging and
burglary. The respondents’ median estimate of the
proportion of rapists sent to prison was 50%, whereas the
true figure was over 95% (and that excludes those who
were sent to secure mental hospitals). The median estimate
of the proportion of adult muggers sent to prison was 35%,
whereas over 90% of adult male offenders convicted of any
form of robbery in 1995 were sent to prison. (This figure
would have included other forms of robbery apart from
mugging, so the proportion sent to prison for offences of
mugging may have been lower, but it would still have been
far higher than the great majority of respondents believed.)
The respondents’ median estimate of the proportion of
male adult house burglars sent to prison was 30%, whereas
in 1995 61% of convicted adult male house burglars were
imprisoned.
Respondents were also asked what percentage of such
offenders ought to go to prison. The mean responses were
94% for rapists and 84% for muggers, figures in line with
the courts’ actual practice, in contrast with the
respondents’ general answers that the courts were over-
lenient. For burglars, respondents were asked a general
question and given a specific example. On the question
what proportion of adult house burglars should be sent to12
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prison, the mean figure was 80%, with 42% saying that all
adult burglars should go to prison.
The specific example was based on a true case of a man
aged 23, with previous convictions for burglary, who
pleaded guilty to a day time burglary of a cottage belonging
to an elderly man while he was out. The defendant took a
video worth £150 and a television which he left damaged
near the scene of the crime. He was given a three year
sentence in the Crown Court, which was reduced on
appeal to two years.
The respondents were divided into two groups. One
group was provided with a list of sentencing alternatives
and asked to choose one or more punishments. The other
group was not provided with a list of alternatives. The
object of splitting them in this way was to test the
hypothesis that the top of the head reaction of most people
is to think first about imprisonment, and that their opinion
my change when they consider other alternatives.
Of the group provided with a choice of alternatives, 54%
favoured immediate imprisonment. Of the group not
provided with a menu of options, 67% favoured immediate
imprisonment. Of those who chose immediate
imprisonment, the median term favoured was 12 months.
This study does not stand alone. Similar lessons can be
learned from the 1998 and 2000 British Crime Surveys
(see Mattinson and Mirrlees-Black (2000) “Attitudes to
Crime and Criminal Justice: Findings from the 1998
British Crime Survey” (Home Office Research Study No.
200); Mirrlees-Black (2001) “Confidence in the Criminal
Justice System: Findings from the 2000 British Crime
Survey” (Home Office Research Findings No. 137)).
There were differences in matters of detail. For example,
in 1998 the categories of police recorded violence were
divided into more and less serious violence, the latter
including common assault. Including common assaults, the
proportion of violent crime rose to 12%; without it, the
proportion was 8%; but the pattern of great overestimation
of the proportion of violent crime was similar.
Researchers have recently carried out a detailed survey
for the Home Office of perceptions among jurors. The
results have not yet been published, but it will be
interesting to see to what extent the results of opinion polls
about judges being out of touch and bad at their job are
supported or contradicted by the experiences of those who
have served as jurors.
It is not surprising that the public should have mistaken
beliefs about levels of crime, particularly violent crime, and
patterns of sentencing. Serious violent crimes are
newsworthy. The media also naturally report cases where
they think that the sentencing is questionable.
Nor is it particularly surprising that general responses to
opinion poll questions about how a particular kind of
offender should be dealt with may differ markedly from
responses when more information is given. When people
are asked a general question about a type of crime, it is
natural for them to think immediately about the worst kind
of examples. The more that people are told about a case,
the more difference it is likely to make to their view of the
appropriate penalty. Many examples could be given to show
this.
An early study conducted in Canada compared the
responses to sentencing of two groups of people. One
group read a newspaper account of a sentencing decision
involving a case of assault. The second group was given a
summary of the court documents. Both groups were asked
what they thought of the sentence that had been imposed.
63% of the group which read the newspaper report thought
that the sentence imposed was too lenient. The majority of
the group that read the summary of the court documents
thought that the sentence was too severe (see Doob and
Roberts (1983): “An Analysis of the Public View of
Sentencing” (Canadian Department of Justice), cited in Penal
Populism and Public Opinion by Roberts, Stalans, Indermaur
and Haugh (2003 Oxford University Press, 29–30)).
In Canada a survey conducted in 1988 found that four
out of five respondents thought that convicted murderers
should never be paroled (Roberts (1988) Early Release:
What do the Canadian Public Really Think? (Canadian
Journal of Criminology 30: 231–39)). By contrast, under
section 745.6 of the Canadian Criminal Code almost all
inmates convicted of murder and sentenced to life
imprisonment may apply for a jury review of their parole
eligibility date. Prisoners serving life sentences for first
degree murder must serve 25 years before becoming
eligible for parole, but at the 15 year point they can ask a
jury to review their parole eligibility date. In four out of
five applications to date, juries have reduced the number of
years that the prisoner must serve prior to becoming eligible
for parole (Roberts (2002) “Determining Parole Eligibility
Dates for Life Prisoners: Lessons from Jury Hearings In
Canada” (Punishment and Society, Vol. 4: 103–14)).
It is easy, but I think unfair, to blame the media for
public misapprehensions about crime and sentencing. It is
simply a fact of life that stories of serious crime make news,
especially if the sentence is thought by the victim or by the
reporter to be too lenient.
What is undesirable is that uninformed, or
misinformed, generalised opinions about over-leniency of
the courts should feed into the fixing of sentences and
sentencing policies in the name of democracy in order to
meet supposed public demand.
Unfortunately this has happened, and the phenomenon
is not peculiar to Britain. A recent book by four
criminologists, Roberts, Stalans, Indermaur and Hough,
entitled ‘Penal Populism and Public Opinion’ (2003 Oxford
University Press) shows that there has been a similar
pattern over the last decade in Australia, Canada, England
and Wales, New Zealand and the United States. In all of
these countries there has been a marked rise in sentencing 13





in recent years, corresponding with widespread public
beliefs that crime has been rising sharply, although
reported crime rates have mostly been falling or static. The
rise in sentencing has not been research based or rationally
explained. It has mainly been a response to what the
authors describe as penal populism, a term which they use
to describe demands for stronger penalties based on
general public attitudes that courts are soft on criminals
rather than a more careful study of informed public
opinion. They argue that:
“ A central feature of populist strategy is to accept public
opinion as an unproblematic entity that has a distinct shape
and direction. This view is contradicted by the findings of
numerous studies on public opinion in relation to crime and
punishment which find that it is malleable, is based on a
series of false assumptions, and will readily respond to
reasonable propositions or alternatives” (p. 88).
The authors agree that public attitudes must and should
be taken into account in sentencing policy, but they say:
“Improving the measurement of public attitudes requires closer
adherence to best practices in designing polls. For example, it
is bad practice to ask people questions when it is clear that
the majority lack the information necessary to make a sensible
response. It is bad practice to use loaded terms: for example,
asking if the courts are ‘tough enough on persistent criminals’
is guaranteed to elicit agreement from the vast majority of the
population. Although these are obvious enough lessons, …
many surveys of the public continue to ignore them. … Better
measurement of public attitudes also involves placing the
results of an opinion poll in some context. This context would
include information about what people would know of the
problem being explored in the poll, as well as the results of
previous polls dealing with the same issue.”
In this country some part of the rise in sentencing has
been due to mandatory sentences, but much more has
been due to a general rise in sentences imposed by courts
within their discretion. We do not have sentencing by jury,
which would be a form of mini-plebiscite, not only because
that would be likely to produce wide inconsistencies, but
also because part of a judge’s training is to learn the
approved brackets of penalty for different kinds of offence,
to gain knowledge and understanding of the different types
of penalty and their general success rates, and to evaluate
various factors in the case before the court. Setting the
appropriate brackets is not a matter of science, and one of
the important factors is public opinion. If judges are to
take into account public opinion in a rational way, as is
plainly desirable, it seems to me that they need more
assistance in understanding what properly researched
public opinion shows. A sentencing advisory council may
be the best body for evaluating the available material and
giving guidance to judges, which would be publicly
available. In the USA membership and activities of such
commissions have tended to be influenced by political
considerations. While Parliament has a right to set
maximum and minimum penalties, it seems to me a much
better that a panel responsible for recommending
appropriate brackets of sentence within those limits should
do so on a non-partisan basis, taking full account of properly
researched views of the public. Such a body should also
help to dispel some of the misconceptions which have affected
present levels of confidence in the criminal justice system.
We already have a Sentencing Advisory Panel, and its
views are taken into account by the Court of Appeal in
setting sentencing guidelines. Under the Criminal Justice
Bill it is proposed that the Sentencing Advisory Panel
should be retained but there should also be a Sentencing
Guidelines Council, containing a majority of judicial
members and some lay members. It is also proposed that a
sentencer who departs from guidelines issued by the
council will be required to state the reasons for doing so.
Whatever its membership, the quality of the guidance
issued by such a body would be only as good as the material
on which it is based. By way of illustration, the findings of
a recent publication by the Patterns of Crime Group within
the Home Office, entitled Crime in England and Wales
2001/02, show that perceptions of crime differ markedly
between tabloid and broadsheet readers, but it would not
be satisfactory if the council’s recommendations were to
vary according to whether it consisted predominantly of
broadsheet or tabloid readers.
If the council’s recommendations are to be based on
something more objective than the individual perceptions
of its members and their unscientific impressions of what
the public would want, it needs to be in a position to
obtain or commission properly researched and reliable
information, and to inform the public (including sentencers)
how it has arrived at its conclusions. This is particularly
important since its guidelines will carry legal force.
Twenty-five years ago Professor Nigel Walker wrote in the
first chapter of his book ‘Sentencing in a Rational Society’ that:
“If the criminal law as a whole is the Cinderella of jurisprudence,
then the law of sentencing is Cinderella’s illegitimate baby.”
The key principles underlying any fair and wise system of
sentencing are, first, that sentencing policies should be
worked out on an informed and rational basis, taking into
account the objects of punishment (generally accepted to
be retribution, prevention, deterrence and reform), crime
trends, informed public opinion, the experience of other
countries and the success rates attaching to different types
of sentence; and second, that individual sentences should
be determined, in Mill’s words, with calmness and
impartiality. If that is not only done (as I believe happens
to a greater extent than is generally appreciated, although
we can do better) but importantly seen to be done, the
system ought to deserve the confidence and acceptance of
the public.
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